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Abstract: We consider a Markovian queue subject to Poisson generated catastrophes. When-
ever a catastrophe occurs, all customers are forced to abandon the system, the server is rendered
inoperative and an exponential repair time is set on. We assume that the arriving customers
decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a natural reward-cost structure. We study
the balking behavior of the customers and derive the corresponding Nash equilibrium strategies.
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1 Introduction
Queues with removals of customers before being served are often encountered in practice. One
type of such a situation appears in queueing systems with reneging, where customers are impa-
tient and as soon as their patience times expire they leave the system. Another type of such a
situation occurs in systems that are subject to catastrophes/failures. Such events usually render
the server(s) inoperative and in addition force the customers to leave the system. The crucial
difference between these two types of abandonments is that the customers decide whether to
leave the system or not according to their own desire in the case of reneging, while they are
forced to abandon the system in the case of catastrophes.
During the last decades, there is an emerging tendency to study queueing systems from an
economic viewpoint. More concretely, a certain reward-cost structure is imposed on the sys-
tem that reflects the customers’ desire for service and their unwillingness to wait. Customers
are allowed to make decisions about their actions in the system, for example they may decide
whether to join or balk, to wait or abandon, to retry or not etc. The customers want to maximize
their benefit, taking into account that the other customers have the same objective, and so the
situation can be considered as a game among the customers. In this type of studies, the main
goal is to find individual and social optimal strategies. The study of queueing systems under a
game-theoretic perspective was initiated by Naor (1969) who studied the M/M/1 model with
a linear reward-cost structure. Naor (1969) assumed that an arriving customer observes the
number of customers and then makes his decision whether to join or balk (observable case). His
study was complemented by Edelson and Hildebrand (1975) who considered the same queueing
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system but assumed that the customers make their decisions without being informed about the
state of the system. Since then, there is a growing number of papers that deal with the economic
analysis of the balking behavior of customers in variants of the M/M/1 queue, see e.g. Burne-
tas and Economou (2007) (M/M/1 queue with setup times), Economou and Kanta (2008a,b)
(M/M/1 queue with compartmented waiting space, M/M/1 queue with unreliable server), Guo
and Zipkin (2007) (M/M/1 queue with various levels of information and non-linear reward-cost
structure), Hassin and Haviv (1997) (M/M/1 queue with priorities), Hassin (2007) (M/M/1
queue with various levels of information and uncertainty in the system parameters). The mono-
graphs of Hassin and Haviv (2003) and Stidham (2009) summarize the main approaches and
several results in the broader area of the economic analysis of queueing systems.
The study of the equilibrium customer behavior in queueing systems with abandonments
has received less attention. Hassin and Haviv (1995) identified equilibrium customer strategies
regarding balking and reneging in the M/M/1 queue, where the reward for an individual re-
duces to zero if its waiting time exceeds a certain threshold time. Mandelbaum and Shimkin
(2000) considered a quite general model for abandonments from a queue, due to excessive wait,
assuming that waiting customers act rationally but without being able to observe the queue
length. More importantly they allowed customers to be heterogeneous in their preferences and
consequent behavior. Other authors have also considered the equilibrium behavior of customers
in queueing systems with abandonments due to reneging. Hassin and Haviv (2003), in Chapter
5, summarize the main results for such models. However, to the best of our knowledge, studies
for the equilibrium behavior of customers in queueing systems with abandonments/removals of
customers due to catastrophic events do not yet exist. It is the aim of the present paper to
study the equilibrium behavior of customers in the context of a simple queueing model subject
to catastrophes.
More specifically, in the present paper, we investigate the equilibrium balking behavior of
customers in a queue of M/M/1 type with complete removals at Poisson generated catastro-
phe epochs. A catastrophe renders the server inactive (due to either a failure or preventive
check/maintenance) and a repair time is set on. During the repair time the system does not
admit customers. When the repair time is completed, the system behaves as an M/M/1 queue
till the next catastrophe and so on. We impose on the system a linear reward-cost structure
as the one in Naor (1969) and Edelson and Hildebrand (1975). However, we make a modifica-
tion, considering two different types of reward: the first one is the usual reward received by the
customers that leave the system after service completion, while the second is a compensation
received by those that are forced to abandon the system due to a catastrophe. In fact the role
of this compensation is to mitigate customers’ dissatisfaction. We again study the customers’
behavior regarding the dilemma whether to join or balk. We consider two cases with respect to
the level of information available to customers before making their decisions. More specifically,
at his arrival epoch, an arbitrary customer may or may not be informed about the state of the
system (observable and unobservable cases correspondingly). In each case, we characterize cus-
tomer equilibrium strategies and we treat the social optimization problem. We also explore the
effect of the information level on the equilibrium behavior of the customers through numerical
comparisons.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the dynamics of the model,
the reward-cost structure and the decision framework. In Section 3 we determine equilibrium
threshold strategies for the observable case, in which customers get informed about the state of
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the system before making their decisions. In Section 4 we study the unobservable case, deriving
mixed equilibrium balking strategies. Finally, in Section 5, we treat the social optimization prob-
lem. Moreover, we present the results from several numerical experiments that demonstrate the
effect of the information level on the behavior of the customers and on the various performance
measures of the system.
2 Model description
We consider a single-server queue with infinite waiting space, where customers arrive according
to a Poisson process at rate λ. The service requirements of successive customers are indepen-
dent and identically distributed random variables with exponential distribution with rate µ. The
server serves the customers one by one. The system is subject to catastrophes/failures according
to a Poisson process at rate ξ. When a catastrophe occurs all customers are forced to abandon
the system prematurely, without being served. The system is rendered inoperative and a repair
process is set on. The length of a repair time is exponentially distributed at rate η. During a
repair time, arrivals are not accepted. We finally assume that interarrival times, service times,
intercatastrophe times and repair times are mutually independent.
We represent the state of the system at time t by a pair (Q(t), I(t)), where Q(t) records the
number of customers at the system and I(t) denotes the server state, with 1 describing a system
in operation and 0 describing a system under repair. Note that whenever I(t) is zero, Q(t)
should be necessarily zero too. Thus, the stochastic process {(Q(t), I(t)) : t ≥ 0} is a continuous
time Markov chain with state space S = {(n, 1) , n ≥ 0}∪{(0, 0)} and its transition rate diagram
is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Transition rate diagram of {(Q(t), I(t))}.
We are interested in the behavior of customers, when they have the option to decide whether
to join or balk. We model this decision framework by assuming that each customer receives
either a reward of Rs units for completing service or a compensation of Rf units in case that
he is forced to abandon the system due to a failure. Moreover, a customer is charged a cost of
C units per time unit that he remains in the system (either in queue or in the service space).
We also assume that customers are risk neutral and wish to maximize their net benefit. Finally,
their decisions are assumed irrevocable, meaning that neither reneging of entering customers nor
retrials of balking customers are allowed.
Since all customers are assumed indistinguishable, we can consider the situation as a sym-
metric game among them. Denote the common set of strategies (set of available actions) and
the payoff function by S and F respectively. More concretely, let F (stagged, sothers) be the payoff
for a tagged customer who follows strategy stagged, when all other customers follow sothers. A
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strategy s1 is said to dominate strategy s2 if F (s1, s) ≥ F (s2, s), for every s ∈ S and for at
least one s the inequality is strict. A strategy s∗ is said to be weakly dominant if it domi-
nates all other strategies in S. A strategy s˜ is said to be a best response against a strategy
sothers, if F (s˜, sothers) ≥ F (stagged, sothers), for every stagged ∈ S. Finally, a strategy se is said
to be a (symmetric) Nash equilibrium, if and only if it is a best response against itself, i.e.
F (se, se) ≥ F (s, se), for every s ∈ S. The intuitive interpretation of a Nash equilibrium is that
it is a stable point of the game in the sense that if all customers agree to follow it, then no
one can benefit by changing it. We remark that the notion of a dominant strategy is stronger
than the notion of an equilibrium. In fact, every dominant strategy is an equilibrium, but the
converse is not true. Moreover, while equilibrium strategies exist in most situations, a dominant
strategy rarely does.
In the next sections we obtain customer equilibrium strategies for joining/balking. We dis-
tinguish two cases with respect to the level of information available to customers at their arrival
instants, before their decisions are made; the observable case (where customers observe Q (t))
and the unobservable case.
3 Equilibrium strategies - the observable case
In this section we study the model, under the assumption that the customers who find the
server active observe the number of customers in the system, before deciding whether to enter
or balk. We prove that a threshold type dominant strategy exists, which constitutes the unique
equilibrium balking strategy for the customers in the system. We first give the expected net
reward of a customer that observes n customers ahead of him and decides to enter. We have
the following.
Proposition 3.1 Consider the observable model of the M/M/1 queue with catastrophes caus-
ing complete removals of customers. The expected net benefit of a customer that observes n
customers in the system upon arrival and decides to enter is given by
Sobs(n) = Rs
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)n+1
+Rf
[
1−
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)n+1]
− C
ξ
[
1−
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)n+1]
, n ≥ 0. (3.1)
Proof. Consider a tagged customer that finds the system at state (n, 1) upon arrival and
decides to enter. This customer may leave the system either due to its service completion or
due to a catastrophe that will force him to abandon prematurely the system. For his service
completion, he has to wait for a sum of n+ 1 independent exponentially distributed times with
parameter µ (note that because of the memoryless property of the exponential distribution,
we can assume that the distribution of the remaining service time of the customer in service
is identical to the service time distribution of the other customers). For the next catastrophe,
he has to wait for an exponentially distributed time with parameter ξ. Therefore, the sojourn
time of such a customer in the system is given as Z = min(Yn,X), where Yn follows a Gamma
distribution with parameters n + 1, µ and X is an exponentially distributed random variable
with rate ξ, independent of Yn. Moreover, the tagged customer will be served with probability
Pr[Yn < X], while he will be forced to abandon the system due to a catastrophe with the
4
complementary probability Pr[Yn ≥ X]. Therefore his net benefit will be
Sobs(n) = Rs Pr [Yn < X] +Rf Pr [Yn ≥ X]− CE [Z] . (3.2)
Note now that
Pr [Yn < X] =
∫ ∞
0
e−ξy
µn+1
n!
yne−µydy =
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)n+1
(3.3)
and
E [Z] =
∫ ∞
0
e−ξz
∫ ∞
z
µn+1
n!
une−µudu dz =
1
ξ
[
1−
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)n+1]
. (3.4)
Plugging (3.3) and (3.4) in (3.2) yields (3.1). 
We now consider an arbitrary customer who observes upon arrival the state of the system.
Since arrivals are not permitted during the repair time, if a customer observes the system at
state (0, 0), he is not allowed to enter and thus there is no decision. So, we only consider the
case where a customer observes the system at a state (n, 1). Such a customer strictly prefers
to enter if his net benefit is positive, is indifferent between joining and balking if it is zero and
strictly prefers to balk if it is negative. In the sequel, we suppose for simplicity that customers
break ties in favor of entering. We have the following.
Theorem 3.1 In the observable model of the M/M/1 queue with catastrophes causing com-
plete removals of customers, a unique dominant pure strategy exists (which is also the unique
equilibrium strategy). There are three cases:
Case I: Rf <
C
ξ
− µRs
ξ
.
Then the unique dominant strategy is always to balk.
Case II: C
ξ
− µRs
ξ
≤ Rf < Cξ .
Then the unique dominant strategy is the threshold strategy ‘While arriving at time t and
finding the system operative, observe Q(t); enter if Q (t) ≤ ne and balk otherwise’, where
ne is given by
ne =
⌊
lnK
lnS
− 1
⌋
(3.5)
with
K =
C
ξ
−Rf
Rs −Rf + Cξ
, S =
µ
µ+ ξ
(3.6)
and ⌊x⌋ denotes the floor of x, i.e. the greatest integer which is smaller than or equal to
x.
Case III: Rf ≥ Cξ .
Then the unique dominant strategy is always to enter.
Proof. Consider a tagged customer that observes the system upon arrival. If he finds the
system at state (n, 1) and decides to enter, then his expected net benefit is given by (3.1). The
customer will prefer to enter if Sobs(n) ≥ 0, which is written easily as(
Rs −Rf + C
ξ
)
·
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)n+1
≥ C
ξ
−Rf . (3.7)
5
Since Rs −Rf + Cξ > Cξ −Rf , we have the following three cases.
Case A: C
ξ
−Rf > 0⇔ Rf < Cξ .
We can solve (3.7) with respect to n and we obtain that the tagged customer is willing to
enter as long as he observes at most ne customers in the system with ne given by (3.5). However,
it is easy to see that ne given by (3.5) becomes negative when Rf <
C
ξ
− µRs
ξ
. Therefore, it is then
optimal always to balk and we conclude with Case I. On the other hand, when C
ξ
−µRs
ξ
≤ Rf < Cξ ,
the threshold ne given by (3.5) is non-negative and we conclude with Case II.
Case B: Rs −Rf + Cξ > 0 ≥ Cξ −Rf ⇔ Cξ ≤ Rf < Cξ +Rs.
In this case the inequality (3.7) is always true. Therefore the tagged customer is always
willing to enter.
Case C: 0 ≥ Rs −Rf + Cξ > Cξ −Rf ⇔ Rf ≥ Cξ +Rs.
Solving inequality (3.7) with respect to n shows that the customer is willing to enter as
long as as he observes at least ne customers in the system with ne given by (3.5). However, ne
is easily seen to be negative in this case, so it is always preferable for the customer to enter.
Therefore, Cases B and C yield to Case III of the statement.
Note that the strategies prescribed above are dominant, since they do not depend on what
the other customers do, i.e. they are best responses against any strategy of the others. 
Remark 3.1 The equilibrium (dominant) strategies do not depend on the value of the repair
rate η. This happens because the customers make decisions only whenever arrive at an operative
system. On the contrary, the social optimal strategies do depend on η, as we will see in Section
5. Furthermore, in the limiting case where ξ → 0, we can easily check, using L’Hospital rule,
that the threshold ne tends to the threshold derived by Naor (1969) for the M/M/1 system.
4 Equilibrium strategies - the unobservable case
We now turn our interest to the unobservable case, in which the customers only know the values
of the system parameters λ, µ, ξ and η and of the economic parameters Rs, Rf and C, but do
not observe the state of the system upon arrival. Thus, there are only two pure strategies, ‘to
join’ and ‘to balk’ and a mixed strategy is specified by the joining probability q of an arriving
customer that finds the server operative. Our goal in this section is to identify the equilibrium
mixed balking strategies.
Suppose that the customers follow a mixed strategy with joining probability q. Then, the
system behaves as the original, but with arrival rate λq instead of λ. Its transition diagram is
seen in Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Transition rate diagram of {(Q(t), I(t))} for a given mixed balking strategy q.
We have the following.
6
Proposition 4.1 Consider the unobservable model of the M/M/1 queue with catastrophes caus-
ing complete removals of customers, in which the customers that find the server operative join
with probability q. The stationary probabilities pun(k, i) of the system are given by
pun(0, 0) =
ξ
ξ + η
, (4.1)
pun(k, 1) =
η (1− x2(q)) x2(q)k
ξ + η
, k ≥ 0, (4.2)
where x2(q) is given by
x2(q) =
(λq + µ+ ξ)−
√
(λq + µ+ ξ)2 − 4λqµ
2µ
. (4.3)
The expected net benefit of a customer that enters with probability q′ given that the system is
found operative, when the others follow a strategy q is given by
Sun(q
′, q) = q′
[(
Rs −Rf + C
ξ
)
µ (1− x2(q))
µ+ ξ − µx2(q) +Rf −
C
ξ
]
. (4.4)
Proof. The balance equations for the stationary distribution of the Markov chain {(Q(t), I(t))}
are given as follows:
ηpun(0, 0) = ξ
∞∑
k=0
pun(k, 1), (4.5)
(λq + ξ) pun(0, 1) = µpun(1, 1) + ηpun(0, 0), (4.6)
(λq + µ+ ξ) pun(k, 1) = λqpun(k − 1, 1) + µpun(k + 1, 1), k ≥ 1. (4.7)
Equation (4.5) and the normalization equation pun(0, 0)+
∑∞
k=0 pun(k, 1) = 1 imply immediately
(4.1). Equation (4.7) can be considered as a homogeneous linear difference equation of order 2
with constant coefficients and characteristic equation
(λq + µ+ ξ)x = λq + µx2 (4.8)
that has two roots, x1(q) and x2(q), given by
x1,2(q) =
(λq + µ+ ξ)±
√
(λq + µ+ ξ)2 − 4λqµ
2µ
. (4.9)
From the standard theory of homogeneous linear difference equations (see e.g. Elaydi (1999)
Section 2.3) we conclude that pun(k, 1) = c1(q)x1(q)
k + c2(q)x2(q)
k, for k ≥ 0, where c1(q) and
c2(q) are constants to be determined. We can easily check that x1(q) > 1, hence c1(q) should
be necessarily 0, for pun(k, 1), k ≥ 0, are probabilities and so should remain bounded. The
constant c2(q) can be calculated using the normalization equation and we deduce (4.2).
The expected net benefit of a customer that decides to enter when the others follow the
strategy q can be computed by conditioning on the state that he observes upon arrival. The
probability that an arriving customer finds n customers in the system, given that he finds the
server operative (and so he can decide whether to enter or not) is
parr(·,1)un (k, 1) =
λpun(k, 1)∑∞
i=0 λpun(i, 1)
= (1− x2(q))x2(q)k, k ≥ 0. (4.10)
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Such a customer receives on the average Sobs(k) units, given by (3.1). Therefore, the expected
net benefit of a customer that decides to enter given that he has found an operative system and
the others follow the strategy q is given by
Sun(1, q) =
∞∑
k=0
parr(·,1)un (k, 1)Sobs(k)
=
∞∑
k=0
(1− x2(q))x2(q)k
{
Rs
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)k+1
+ (Rf − C
ξ
)
[
1−
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)k+1]}
=
(
Rs −Rf + C
ξ
)
µ (1− x2(q))
µ+ ξ − µx2(q) +Rf −
C
ξ
. (4.11)
By the linearity of Sun(q
′, q) with respect to the first argument, we have that Sun(q′, q) =
(1− q′)Sun(0, q) + q′Sun(1, q) and we obtain readily (4.4). 
We can now proceed to determine the equilibrium balking strategies of a customer in the
unobservable case. We have the following.
Theorem 4.1 In the unobservable model of the M/M/1 queue with catastrophes causing com-
plete removals of customers, a unique equilibrium mixed strategy exists, with joining probability
qe given by
qe =


0 if Rf ≤ Cξ − µRsξ
(C−ξRf+ξRs)(µRs+ξRf−C)
λ(C−ξRf )Rs if
C
ξ
− µRs
ξ
< Rf <
C
ξ
− µRs(1−x2)
ξ
1 if Rf ≥ Cξ − µRs(1−x2)ξ ,
(4.12)
where x2 = x2(1) (using (4.3) for q = 1).
Proof. Suppose that customers who find the server operative enter with probability q and
consider a tagged arriving customer. Then, the tagged customer prefers to enter if Sun(1, q) >
0, he is indifferent between entering and balking if Sun(1, q) = 0 and he prefers to balk if
Sun(1, q) < 0. We consider the equation Sun(1, q) = 0 with Sun(1, q) given by (4.11) and we
solve for x2(q). It may be easily checked that the above equation has a unique solution given
from
x2e =
µRs + ξRf − C
µRs
(4.13)
and the corresponding qe is found by solving (4.8), for x = x2e, with respect to q. This yields
qe =
x2e[µ(1− x2e) + ξ]
λ(1− x2e) =
(C − ξRf + ξRs)(µRs + ξRf − C)
λ(C − ξRf )Rs
. (4.14)
We can now easily see that qe given by (4.14) lies in the interval (0, 1) if and only if Rf ∈(
C
ξ
− µRs
ξ
, C
ξ
− µRs(1−x2)
ξ
)
and we obtain the second branch of (4.12). On the other hand, we
can check that Sun(1, q) is positive for all q ∈ [0, 1], when Rf ≥ Cξ − µRs(1−x2)ξ and, as a result, a
customer’s best response is 1 in this case. Thus, ‘enter’ is the unique equilibrium strategy and
we obtain the third branch of (4.12).
Finally, for q = 0, the system alternates between only two states, pun(0, 0) and pun(0, 1), and
the stationary probabilities are pun(0, 0) =
ξ
ξ+η and pun(0, 1) =
η
ξ+η . We can see that Sun(1, 0)
is non-positive if and only if Rf ≤ Cξ − µRsξ . Therefore, in this interval, q = 0 is the unique
equilibrium strategy and we obtain the first branch of (4.12). 
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Remark 4.1 The equilibrium strategies do not depend on the value of the repair rate η. This
happens because the customers only make decisions whenever they arrive at an operative system.
However, unlike the observable case, social optimal strategies do not depend on η either, as we
will see in Section 5. Furthermore, in the limiting case where ξ → 0, we can easily check that the
equilibrium probability qe tends to the equilibrium probability derived by Edelson and Hildebrand
(1975) for the M/M/1 system.
5 Social optimal strategies - conclusions
We are now studying the problem of social optimization. We treat separately the observable
and unobservable cases. We are interested in determining the optimal values of the expected net
social benefit (per time unit) functions, Ssocobs(n) and S
soc
un (q), and the corresponding arguments,
nsoc and qsoc respectively. First we consider the observable case and we have the following
Proposition 5.1.
Proposition 5.1 Consider the observable model of the M/M/1 queue with catastrophes causing
complete removals of customers. The expected net social benefit per time unit, given that the
customers follow a threshold strategy with threshold n (i.e. arriving customers that observe at
most n customers in an operative system do enter, while the rest balk without being served) is
given by
Ssocobs(n) =
λ(Rs −Rf )
(µ+ ξ)n+1


µd1(n)
[
(µ+ ξ)n+1 − (µx1)n+1
]
µ+ ξ − µx1 +
µd2(n)
[
(µ + ξ)n+1 − (µx2)n+1
]
µ+ ξ − µx2


+λRf
(
η
ξ + η
− d1(n)xn+11 − d2(n)xn+12
)
−Cµ
2
ξ2
d1(n)x1(1− x2)2[1− (n+ 2)xn+11 + (n+ 1)xn+21 ]
−Cµ
2
ξ2
d2(n)x2(1− x1)2[1− (n+ 2)xn+12 + (n+ 1)xn+22 ], n ≥ 0, (5.1)
where x1 = x1(1) and x2 = x2(1) (using (4.9) for q = 1) and d1(n), d2(n) are given by
d1(n) =
−ηξ[(µ + ξ)x2 − λ]xn2
(ξ + η) {(λ+ ξ − µx2)[(µ + ξ)x1 − λ]xn1 − (λ+ ξ − µx1)[(µ + ξ)x2 − λ]xn2}
,(5.2)
d2(n) =
ηξ[(µ + ξ)x1 − λ]xn1
(ξ + η) {(λ+ ξ − µx2)[(µ + ξ)x1 − λ]xn1 − (λ+ ξ − µx1)[(µ + ξ)x2 − λ]xn2}
.(5.3)
Proof. The stationary distribution of the model under a threshold strategy with threshold n
can be found along the same lines with the proof of Proposition 4.1 (i.e. by using the theory of
linear difference equations with constant coefficients). We then obtain that
pobs(0, 0) =
ξ
ξ + η
, (5.4)
pobs(k, 1) = d1(n)x
k
1 + d2(n)x
k
2 , 0 ≤ k ≤ n+ 1, (5.5)
with x1, x2, d1(n) and d2(n) as in the statement of the Proposition. The expected net social
benefit per time unit is then found by
Ssocobs(n) = λP
ser
obsRs + λP
cat
obsRf − CEobs[Q], (5.6)
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where P serobs and P
cat
obs are the fraction of customers that leave the system due to service and
catastrophes respectively and Eobs[Q] is the mean number of customers in system. Using (5.4),
(5.5) and (3.3), we can compute P serobs , P
cat
obs and Eobs[Q] as
P serobs =
n∑
k=0
pobs(k, 1)
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)k+1
=
n∑
k=0
(d1(n)x
k
1 + d2(n)x
k
2)
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)k+1
, (5.7)
P catobs =
n∑
k=0
pobs(k, 1)
[
1−
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)k+1]
=
n∑
k=0
(d1(n)x
k
1 + d2(n)x
k
2)
[
1−
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)k+1]
, (5.8)
Eobs[Q] =
n+1∑
k=0
kpobs(k, 1) =
n+1∑
k=0
k(d1(n)x
k
1 + d2(n)x
k
2). (5.9)
Computing the relevant geometric sums in (5.7) - (5.9) and substituting in (5.6) yields (5.1). 
Unfortunately, the very involved form of (5.1) does not allow the derivation of its maximum
in closed analytic form. However, it can be numerically evaluated quite easily. Thus, we turn
to numerical experiments below to derive some qualitative conclusions for the behavior of the
model.
In Figure 3 we consider a model with operation parameters (λ, µ, ξ, η) = (7, 4, 0.4, 2) and
reward-cost parameters (Rs, C) = (7, 3) and we provide a graph of the equilibrium and social
optimal thresholds for the observable case as functions of the failure compensation Rf . We ob-
serve that ne becomes infinity for large values of Rf , while nsoc stabilizes to a certain value for
large values of Rf . Moreover, we observe that nsoc ≤ ne for all values of Rf . These qualitative
facts seem to be valid in general, as it has been verified from a large number of similar numerical
experiments for other values of the parameters.
We now turn to the unobservable case and we obtain the following Proposition 5.2.
Proposition 5.2 Consider the unobservable model of the M/M/1 queue with catastrophes caus-
ing complete removals of customers. The expected net social benefit per time unit, given that the
customers follow a mixed strategy with joining probability q (i.e. arriving customers that find an
operative system enter with probability q, while the rest balk without being served) is given by
Ssocun (q) =
ηx2(q)[µRs(1− x2(q)) + ξRf − C]
(ξ + η)(1 − x2(q)) , (5.10)
with x2(q) given by (4.3).
Proof. The expected net social benefit per time unit is given by
Ssocun (q) = λP
ser
un Rs + λP
cat
un Rf − CEun[Q], (5.11)
where P serun and P
cat
un are the fractions of customers that join but leave the system due to service
and catastrophes respectively and Eun[Q] is the mean number of customers in system. Using
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(4.1), (4.2) and (3.3), we can compute P serun , P
cat
un and Eun[Q] as
P serun =
∞∑
k=0
pun(k, 1)q
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)k+1
=
∞∑
k=0
η (1− x2(q)) x2(q)k
ξ + η
q
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)k+1
, (5.12)
P catun =
∞∑
k=0
pun(k, 1)q
[
1−
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)k+1]
=
∞∑
k=0
η (1− x2(q)) x2(q)k
ξ + η
q
[
1−
(
µ
µ+ ξ
)k+1]
, (5.13)
Eun[Q] =
∞∑
k=0
kpun(k, 1) =
∞∑
k=0
k
η (1− x2(q)) x2(q)k
ξ + η
. (5.14)
Computing the geometric sums in (5.12) - (5.14) and substituting in (5.11) yields (5.10). 
Unlike the observable case, it is possible here to obtain the optimal joining probability qsoc
in closed form and we can also compare it with the corresponding equilibrium probability qe.
The results are summarized in the following Theorem 5.1.
Theorem 5.1 In the unobservable model of the M/M/1 queue with catastrophes causing com-
plete removals of customers, a unique social optimal strategy exists, with joining probability qsoc
given by
qsoc =


0 if Rf ≤ Cξ − µRsξ√
D(µRs−
√
D)(ξRs+
√
D)
λDRs
if C
ξ
− µRs
ξ
< Rf <
C
ξ
− µRs(1−x2)2
ξ
1 if Rf ≥ Cξ − µRs(1−x2)
2
ξ
,
(5.15)
where
D = µRs (C − ξRf ) (5.16)
and x2 = x2(1) (using (4.3) for q = 1). Moreover, the social optimal joining probability is always
smaller than the individual one, i.e.
qsoc ≤ qe. (5.17)
Proof. We observe that the function Ssocun (q) given by (5.10) can be written as the composition
of f(x) and x2(q) (i.e. S
soc
un (q) = f(x2(q))), with
f(x) =
ηx[µRs(1− x) + ξRf − C]
(ξ + η)(1 − x) (5.18)
and x2(q) given by (4.3). Note also that the function x2(q) is strictly increasing for q ∈ [0, 1]
and it takes values in [0, x2].
To proceed, we solve the equation
Ssoc
′
un (q) = f
′(x2(q))x
′
2(q) = 0, (5.19)
for q ∈ [0, 1]. However, x′2(q) 6= 0 for q ∈ [0, 1] and therefore (5.19) is reduced to f ′(x2(q)) = 0.
So we have to solve f ′(x) = 0, which is also written after some straightforward algebra in the
form
µRsx
2 − 2µRsx+ (µRs + ξRf − C) = 0. (5.20)
The discriminant of the quadratic polynomial in (5.20) is non-positive if and only if Rf ≥ Cξ .
In that case, we conclude that f(x) is increasing and consequently Ssocun (q) is also increasing. In
summary we have:
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• Case I: Rf ≥ Cξ . The social optimal joining probability is qsoc = 1.
In case where Rf <
C
ξ
, the equation f ′(x) = 0 (equivalently (5.20)) has two distinct roots
x−2 and x
+
2 given by
x−2 = 1−
√
D
µRs
, x+2 = 1 +
√
D
µRs
, (5.21)
with D given by (5.16). Therefore, the quadratic polynomial in (5.20) is positive for x < x−2 or
x > x+2 and negative for x
−
2 < x < x
+
2 . Due to the one to one correspondence between x2(q)
and q and the fact that x2(q) ∈ [0, x2] for q ∈ [0, 1], we have to consider several cases regarding
the relative order of x−2 , x
+
2 and 0, x2. However, we have that x2 < 1 < x
+
2 and therefore there
are only 3 subcases.
• Case II-a: Rf < Cξ and x−2 ≤ 0. Then, we have necessarily x−2 ≤ 0 < x2 < x+2 . Then f(x)
is decreasing in [0, x2] and consequently S
soc
un (q) is decreasing in [0, 1]. The social optimal
joining probability is qsoc = 0.
• Case II-b: Rf < Cξ and 0 < x−2 < x2. Then, we have that f ′(x) is positive in (0, x−2 ) and
negative in (x−2 , x2) and therefore we conclude that the maximum of S
soc
un (q) is attained
for q such that x2(q) = x
−
2 . The social optimal joining probability is found by substituting
x−2 for x in (4.8) and solving for q. We obtain
qsoc =
x−2 [µ(1− x−2 ) + ξ]
λ(1− x−2 )
(5.22)
and using (5.21) we deduce that
qsoc =
√
D
(
µRs −
√
D
)(
ξRs +
√
D
)
λDRs
. (5.23)
• Case II-c: Rf < Cξ and x−2 ≥ x2. Then we have that f(x) is increasing in [0, x2] and
consequently Ssocun (q) is increasing in [0, 1]. The social optimal joining probability is qsoc =
1.
Using (5.21) and taking into account the common condition Rf <
C
ξ
for Cases IIa-c, we can
easily see that the conditions x−2 ≤ 0, 0 < x−2 < x2 and x−2 ≥ x2 can be written respectively as
Rf ≤ Cξ − µRsξ , Cξ − µRsξ < Rf < Cξ − µRs(1−x2)
2
ξ
and Rf ≥ Cξ − µRs(1−x2)
2
ξ
. By combining Cases
I-II we obtain immediately (5.15).
Regarding the order between qsoc and qe, formulas (4.12) and (5.15) show that qe = qsoc = 0
for Rf ≤ Cξ − µRsξ , whereas qe = qsoc = 1 for Rf ≥ Cξ − µRs(1−x2)
2
ξ
. Moreover, qe = 1 and
qsoc ∈ (0, 1) when Cξ − µRs(1−x2)ξ ≤ Rf < Cξ − µRs(1−x2)
2
ξ
. Thus we have to check the validity
of the inequality qsoc ≤ qe, only for Rf ∈ (Cξ − µRsξ , Cξ − µRs(1−x2)ξ ), i.e. in the interval where
both qe and qsoc are strictly between 0 and 1. Using (4.14) and (5.23), we can easily see after
some algebra that the inequality qsoc ≤ qe is reduced to µ2ξR3s +D
√
D ≥ 0 which clearly holds.
Thus, the inequality is also valid in this case. 
The inequality nsoc ≤ ne that the numerical experiments suggest in combination with the
inequality qsoc ≤ qe that has been analytically proved shows that we have the usual situation
12
also encountered in the pioneering papers of Naor (1969) and Edelson and Hildebrand (1975):
Individual optimization leads to longer queues than it is socially desirable (i.e. in equilibrium
the customers make excessive use of the system). Indeed, a customer that decides to join the
system imposes negative externalities on future arrivals.
Another topic of interest is the comparison between the observable and the unobservable cases
of a given model, i.e. what is the effect of the information on customers’ behavior. The value
of the information has been studied in a number of papers, among them in Hassin (1986, 2007)
and Guo and Zipkin (2007). In the context of the present model, we have run several numerical
scenarios and have compared the expected social profit per time unit for the observable and the
unobservable cases, when the customers use their individual or social optimal strategy. More
concretely, we have been interested in comparing Ssocobs(ne), S
soc
obs(nsoc), S
soc
un (qe) and S
soc
un (qsoc).
The inequalities Ssocobs(ne) ≤ Ssocobs(nsoc) and Ssocun (qe) ≤ Ssocun (qsoc) are obviously valid but the
other relations are not clear. For example it would be interesting to know the relationship
between Ssocun (qsoc) and S
soc
obs(ne) which corresponds to the natural question ‘what is preferable
for the society: to have uninformed altruistic or informed selfish agents?’. The analysis of a
large number of numerical scenarios suggests that the typical ordering is Ssocun (qe) ≤ Ssocun (qsoc) ≤
Ssocobs(ne) ≤ Ssocobs(nsoc). In this sense, it seems that in the majority of such models it is better
for the society the customers to be informed and selfish than uninformed and altruistic. Such
a typical case is presented in Figure 4 for (λ, µ, ξ, η) = (7, 2, 0.7, 1) and (Rs, C) = (7, 3), as Rf
varies in [0, 6]. However, there are some exceptional cases where for low values of Rf we have
that Ssocun (qsoc) ≤ Ssocobs(ne), whereas for high values of Rf we have the reverse inequality. For
intermediate values of Rf the situation is mixed. These cases occur typically for low values
of ξ. Such a numerical scenario is presented in Figure 5 for (λ, µ, ξ, η) = (7, 4, 0.3, 2) and
(Rs, C) = (4, 3), as Rf varies in [0, 10]. Note also that all graphs of S
soc
obs(ne), S
soc
obs(nsoc), S
soc
un (qe)
and Ssocun (qsoc) with respect to Rf coincide for Rf ≥ Cξ . Indeed, for values of Rf exceeding the
mean waiting cost till the next catastrophe, C
ξ
, it is both individually and socially optimal for
the customers to join under any kind of information.
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Figure 3: Equilibrium and social optimal joining thresholds with respect to Rf for the observable
case with (λ, µ, ξ, η) = (7, 4, 0.4, 2) and (Rs, C) = (7, 3).
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Figure 4: Social benefit per time unit with respect to Rf for a model with (λ, µ, ξ, η) =
(7, 2, 0.7, 1) and (Rs, C) = (7, 3).
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Figure 5: Social benefit per time unit with respect to Rf for a model with (λ, µ, ξ, η) =
(7, 4, 0.3, 2) and (Rs, C) = (4, 3).
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